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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee

KENNETH J. WEBSTER
Defendant/Appellant

I.

:

:

Case No. 990764-CA
Priority No. 2

:

THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY AND
STATUTORILY BARRED FROM ADMITTING MS.
GALLEGOS' HEARSAY STATEMENTS AND THEIR
ADMISSION SEVERELY HARMED THE DEFENSE

Throughout its brief, the State applies the wrong standard of review, misrepresents
the facts and confuses the law. The State's erroneous claims to the contrary, Ms.
Gallegos pointedly accused her husband of misleading her and intentionally taking the
car. Because her blame-shifting statements lacked trustworthiness, their admission
deprived Mr. Webster of his right to confrontation. Moreover, the State's failure to notify
the defense of its intent to admit Ms. Gallegos' statements severely prejudiced the defense
and barred the State from admitting them. The admission of the statements also violated
the language and policies behind the Utah constitutional right of a spouse not to testify.
Because Ms. Gallegos' statements provided the only undisputed evidence of the
perpetrator's identity and intent, their admission irreparably harmed the defense.

A.

Because Ms. Gallegos' Statements Lacked
Trustworthiness, Their Admission Violated
Mr. Webster's Confrontation Rights

In asserting that Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements possessed adequate indicia of
reliability, the State applies an abuse of discretion standard. As this Court has ruled, M[a]n
admissibility decision is the 'sum of several rulings, each of which may be reviewed
under a separate standard' of review." State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (quoting State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993)). When
reviewing the "legal content of the trial court's ruling," this Court applies a correction of
error standard. IcL Appellate courts review factual disputes under a clearly erroneous
standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). An abuse of discretion
standard applies only to "rulings requiring a balancing of factors" such deciding whether
to admit prior bad acts. Horton. 848 P.2d at 713; see State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, Tj 18,
993 P.2d 837 (applying abuse of discretion standard to prior act evidence).
A bifurcated standard of review applies to the admission of hearsay statements
under the Confrontation Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. In determining
whether a hearsay statement possesses particular guarantees of trustworthiness, courts
look to the "totality of the circumstances that surround the making of the statement."
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990). In reviewing a trial court's decision under
this test, courts review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness while affording
some degree of discretion to the trial court because of the wide variety of factual settings
2

possible. State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 427 (Utah 1998) (applying test and
accompanying standard of review to waiver of Miranda warnings). In this case, the facts
surrounding Ms. Gallegos' statements are undisputed. Thus, this Court need only review
the correctness of the trial court's legal conclusion to admit the hearsay statements.
Ms. Gallegos' statements were unreliable as a matter of law.

M

[W]hen one person

accuses another of a crime under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by
inculpating another, the accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subject to the
scrutiny of cross-examination." Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986). In equally
strong terms, this Court has concluded that "statements made in an obvious attempt to
curry favor with the authorities by inculpating defendant and exculpating declarant, lack
trustworthiness." State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (fn. omitted).
Despite the State's representations that Ms. Gallegos was not a target of the
investigation and that she offered her statements spontaneously, the circumstances
surrounding her statements demonstrate that she "st[ood] to gain" by blaming her husband
for the missing car. Lee, 476 U.S. at 541. Specifically, the undisputed facts establish that
Ms. Gallegos solely accused Mr. Webster of taking the car in an "attempt to curry favor
with the" police. Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894. Officer Cupello testified that he fully
informed Ms. Gallegos of the gravity of the situation and the nature of his inquiry.
Before questioning her on the day of Mr. Webster's arrest, Officer Cupello explained the
following facts:
3

•

He first specifically informed Ms. Gallegos that her husband had
been arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle. R. 38: 112.

•

He then identified the stolen car as the missing 1988 Nissan Stanza.
R.38: 112-13.

•

He also stated that the police had found the car in the parking lot
where Ms. Gallegos and Mr. Webster lived. R. 38: 113.

After conveying this factual background, Officer Cupello relayed Mr. Webster's
claim that he had never even touched the car. R. 38: 133. Ms. Gallegos immediately
responded, "He is lying." R. 38: 113. Ms. Gallegos then proceeded to disclaim any
knowledge that the car was stolen and asserted that Mr. Webster represented that he had
permission to use the car. R. 38: 113-14. She even admitted to driving the car herself but
contended that Mr. Webster had returned the car two days previously when he had quit
his job. R. 38: 113-14. When Officer Cuppello informed Ms. Gallegos that Mr. Webster
had denied driving the car, she responded, "We have a problem." R. 38: 114.
These facts establish that Mr. Gallegos was fully aware of the implications of her
statements. Rather than "spontaneously]" responding to Officer Cupello's questions as
the State would have this Court believe, Ms. Gallegos was fully apprized that the police
were investigating the possible theft of a car which she had been using as her own only
two days previously. She also knew that the her husband had been implicated in that
alleged crime and that the police were seeking information about it. The only logical
conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that Ms. Gallegos believed that the police were

4

targeting her for using the car herself.
Incredulously, the State claims that these facts were "not such that [Ms. Gallegos]
reasonably would be motivated to divorce herself from the car at her husband's expense."
State's Brief at 15. Quite the contrary, her use of the car gave her "'strong motivation'"
to minimize her connection to the car and to implicate her husband. Lee, 476 U.S. at 541
(quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968)). Ms. Gallegos' recognition
that "We have a problem" eliminated any doubt that she understood the ramifications of
her comments. R. 38: 114 (emphasis added).
The State further distorts the facts in arguing that Ms. Gallegos "did not wholly
exonerate herself of all criminal responsibility for the missing car. State's Brief at 16.
Ms. Gallegos' immediate response to Mr. Webster's claim not to have touched the car
was to pointedly accuse Mr. Webster of "lying." She then denied any culpability and
claimed that Mr. Webster had represented that he had permission to use the car. Thus,
Ms. Gallegos denied any criminal knowledge and intent and, contrary to the State's
claims, she was "anxious" to blame her husband for the missing car. State's Brief at 16.
In addition to mischaracterizing the facts, the State appears to misunderstand the
inherent unreliability of hearsay statements. The State interprets Ms. Gallegos' motives
and intentions favorably to its view and repeatedly argues that there is no reason to
disbelieve Ms. Gallegos or to conclude that she thought she was a target of the
investigation. State's Brief at 14-16. The State fails to comprehend that hearsay is
5
I

"'presumptively unreliable.'" Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990) (quoting Lee,
476 U.S. at 543). Thus, "unless an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in
which the statement was made, provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that a
hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires
exclusion of the out-of-court statement." Id at 821. No "affirmative reason" rebuts the
presumption of unreliability.
The fact that the State admitted the statements through a police officer's memory
of a distant event further diminishes their reliability. In State v. Bertul 664 P.2d 1181,
1185 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that police reports containing witness
statements lack reliability because they are "made in part in contemplation of litigation."
This concern, in turn, raises confrontation issues:
Although the reports may not be readily described as "dripping
with motivation to misrepresent," their exclusion is more
fundamentally explainable on the ground that substantial rights
under the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution,
and especially the right of cross-examination, may be severely
prejudiced when the information in the report calls into question
the motivation and the accuracy of the perception, recall, the
manner of the language usage, or the soundness of conclusions
by the author of the report.
Id at 1185. For these reasons, the Court, refused to allow the State to admit police
reports under the business records exception to the hearsay rule for any reason other than
proving routine matters such as the time and date of a crime.
These concerns are even more pressing when, instead of admitting police reports,
6

police officers testify in court. Given the time length and the dozens of intervening
events between an incident and a subsequent criminal trial, police officers must review
their reports prior to testifying in court to refresh their memories. Accordingly, police
officer testimony not only raises concerns about reliance on police reports but the
accuracy of police officers' memories come into play.
Finally, the admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements was not "'harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.5" State v. Genovesi. 909 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting
Scott v. State, 465 P.2d 620, 622 (Nev. 1970)). Those statements provided the only
undisputed evidence of the key issues tried below: the perpetrator's identity and intent.
Despite the State's naked claim that it presented "compelling evidence," the State
presented no physical evidence linking Mr. Webster to the car. The evidence merely
showed that the police found the car parked in Mr. Webster's common parking lot.
Although Mike McGuire saw Mr. Webster driving the car at some unspecified
time, the State conveniently neglects to mention that Intermountain Volkswagen
authorized salespersons to test drive used cars. R. 38: 79-80. The fact that Mr. McGuire,
who oversaw the acquisition and sale of all used cars, did not object when he saw Mr.
Webster driving the car indicates that Mr. Webster had permission to use it. Because Ms.
Gallegos' statements provided the only other evidence establishing the identity and intent
of the person who removed the car, the admission of that evidence cannot be considered
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 922.
7

B.

The State Failed to Notify the Defense of its
Intent to Admit The Hearsay Statements
Under the Residual Exception to the Hearsay
Rule to the Defense's Extreme Prejudice

The State's failure to notify the defense of its intent to invoke the residual
exception to the hearsay rule further barred the admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements.
The State excuses its duty to provide notice by claiming that Mr. Webster knew of Ms.
Gallegos' statements. It then blames defense counsel for ''miscalculating]" the State's
prosecution strategy and minimizes the decisive blow the admission of Ms. Gallegos'
statements had on the defense. State's Brief at 22. Contrary to the State's claims, the
residual exception's language and policies require the State to give pretrial notice of its
intent to invoke the exception. Even under a more liberal interpretation of the notice
requirement, the State's failure to provide notice unfairly ambushed the defense.
Utah appellate courts have not addressed the notice requirement under the residual
exception to the hearsay rule. The federal courts have adopted two approaches. The first
strictly construes the notice requirement and requires pretrial notice even if the parties are
aware of the evidence. United States v. LaGrua, 182 F.3d 901, 903 (2d Cir. 1999).
Article VIII of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which governs the admission of hearsay,
compels this approach. This Court reviews the trial court's interpretation of court rules
for correctness and accords no deference to its conclusions of law. Ostler v. Buhler, 1999
UT 99, ^ 5, 989 P.2d 1073. In construing court rules, this Court not only must look at the
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plain language of the rule but must also view the provision "in the context of the entire
[regulatory] framework to give effect to the entire . . . scheme." State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d
115, 121 (UtahCt.App. 1991).
Every indication in Article VIII points to requiring specific notice before a party
may invoke the residual exception. Under that Article, parties need only provide pretrial
notice of an intent to admit hearsay evidence when invoking the residual exception. Utah
R. Evid. 803(24), 804(b)(5). Article VIII, thus, treats the residual exception differently
from all other exceptions to the hearsay rule. This special treatment strongly supports
requiring parties to specify their intent to invoke that particular exception, otherwise the
notice requirement serves no purpose.
The language of the residual exception agrees. The exception mandates that the
proponent of hearsay evidence "makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance
of t r i a l . . . the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of i t . . . . "
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5) (emphasis added). Requiring the proponent to express an
"intention" to offer the statement would be superfluous unless the proponent were also
required to specify the method by which the proponent seeks to admit the evidence.
Specifically, no need exists to notify an adverse party that a statement exists because that
fact presumably would be revealed through normal discovery procedures. Thus, an intent
to admit hearsay under the residual exception appears to contemplate more than
acknowledging the existence of a statement. The exception itself recognizes this
9

distinction by requiring the proponent to notify the adverse party of the "particulars" of
the statement rather than simply its existence.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit endorses this approach. In LaGrua,
182 F.3d at 903-04, for example, that court ruled that the proponent of admitting
deposition testimony did not meet the notice requirement even though the proponent had
referred to the deposition and its potential use as trial evidence in a pretrial letter to the
adverse party. The Second Circuit concluded that the residual exception required actual
notice of the proponent's intent not just alerting the adverse party of the deposition. Id.
Sound justifications support requiring specific notice. Trustworthiness is of
paramount concern with the residual exception given its open-ended and ill-defined
nature. An adverse party cannot effectively test the trustworthiness of a hearsay
statement under the residual exception unless that party knows well before trial the
circumstances of the statement and the declarant's and witness's identities.
Notice also avoids the very dangers that arose in this case: surprising and
ultimately prejudicing the adverse party. Defense counsel below specifically relied on the
State's lack of notice and prepared for trial accordingly. Based on his correct assessment
that no established hearsay exceptions applied and his assurance that Ms. Gallegos would
not testify, defense counsel represented to the jury that the State could not establish the
identity of the person who took the car. The admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements
irrefutably contradicted his claims, thereby devastating the defense and undermining his
10

and Mr. Webster's credibility.
The State blames defense counsel for being surprised, minimizes the effects of the
admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements, and disingenuously asserts that the jury was free
to disbelieve Officer Cupello's testimony. State's Brief at 21-23. The State ignores that
the residual exception places the burden of providing notice on the proponent. It does not
require the adverse party to clairvoyantly decipher the State's intentions. Moreover,
because Officer Cupello's testimony was undisputed, the jury had no reason to doubt it.
The State's failure to provide pretrial notice destroyed any chance of Mr. Webster
successfully defending the charges.
Even under the more liberal approach to the notice requirement, the State failed to
meet its obligations. This approach excuses the failure to provide notice if: (1) the
proponent "was not at fault" because the need for the evidence was unanticipated; and, (2)
the adverse party had a "fair opportunity to meet the proffered evidence." Furtado v.
Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 92 (1 st Cir. 1979). The State had no excuse for not notifying the
defense of its intent to invoke the residual exception. In fact, the State discussed with Ms.
Gallegos before trial her reluctance to testify, and, yet, still failed to consider raising the
residual exception until the middle of trial. R. 38: 38.
Likewise, the lack of notice failed to provide Mr. Webster a "fair opportunity to
meet" the hearsay statements. Furtado, 604 F.2d at 92; Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5). Waiting
to invoke the residual exception until after opening statements sabotaged the defense
11

theory and destroyed defense counsel's and Mr. Webster's credibility. The defense was
merely left to argue unconvincingly that Ms. Gallegos did not identify' the car she and her
husband had driven. The mid-trial admission of this evidence deprived the defense of a
"fair" opportunity to meet it.

C.

The Admission of Ms, Gallegos' Hearsay
Statements Violated the Utah Constitutional
Ban Against Compelled Spousal Testimony

Consistent with its prior arguments, the State's discussion of the Utah
constitutional right to be free from being compelled to testify against a spouse is
incomplete. The State satisfies itself with asserting that the plain language of Article I,
section 12 of the Utah Constitution only bars actual testimony. State's Brief at 25-27. In
doing so, the State fails to even mention Utah's tragic experience with the federal
government's polygamy prosecutions that prompted the framers of the Utah Constitution
to "enshrine[]n the spousal testimonial right in the Declaration of Rights. Paul G. Cassell,
The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State
Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751, 820 n.431.
Nor does the State discuss the goals underpinning this right; namely, the
promotion of marital harmony and the preserving of marriages. Understanding these
policies and the historical context are essential to interpreting the spousal testimonial right
because Utah is the only state in the nation that has included this right in its constitution.
12

Apparently, the framers of the Utah Constitution sought to safeguard the spousal
testimonial right from any threats under federal law or even the Federal Constitution.
The State's literal interpretation of this right fails to recognize that it is not only the
act of testifying that ruptures marital relationships but also the fact that a spouse's hearsay
statements provide '"the means of the other's condemnation."' State v. Robertson. 932
P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997) (quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at
Common Law § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). When a spouse produces incriminating
information used at trial, it matters not whether the State presents the evidence through
the spouse or a third party. The source remains the same. In either case, the fact that a
spouse causes the other's plight "clearly lead[s] to marital strife." Id
Limiting the right to actual testimony also risks placing the witness spouse anew in
the "cruel dilemma" of deciding whether to testify. See Edwin B. Firmage & Richard C.
Mangrum, Zion in the Courts: A Legal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 1830-1900 at 209 (1988). Admitting a spouse's incriminating hearsay
statements after the spouse has invoked the right could prompt the spouse to rethink the
decision not to testify in an effort to undo the damage. The hearsay statements place the
spouse a second time "in the unenviable position of either committing perjury or
testifying to matters that are detrimental to his or her spouse." Robertson, 932 P.2d at
1227. In this sense, the witness spouse feels "compelled to testify" in violation of the
plain language of the constitutional provision. Utah Const. Art. I, § 12.
13

The State apparently would have this Court disregard the policies buttressing the
spousal testimonial right. Instead, the State relies on State v. Carter, 888 P.2d P.2d 629
(Utah), cert, denied 516 U.S. 858 (1995), to argue that the right only bars "'the spouse's
testimony in the courtroom.'" IdL at 638-39 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 52 n.12 (1980)) (footnote omitted); see State's Brief at 26. The State conspicuously
fails to mention the actual holding in Carter that immediately follows the quotation above
and which addresses this very case:
The State is free to interrogate and receive information from a
witness spouse on any matter, including confidential
communications, so long as the witness spouse's statement is not
introduced into evidence at trial over the objections of the
accused spouse. Moreover, the State is free to act upon any
information received—it may pursue leads, obtain evidence,
locate witnesses, or engage in any other lawful investigative
procedure. Evidence discovered as a result of the witness
spouse's statements and the State's subsequent investigation is
admissible in court, subject to any relevant constitutional,
statutory, or evidentiary rules of exclusion.
Id, at 639 (emphasis added).
Carter thus holds that the Utah Constitution does not bar the State from using a
spouse's statements to investigate a crime. But, the opinion recognizes a distinction
between actually admitting a spouse's statements at trial and simply using them to
investigate. According to Carter, the real danger lies in introducing "the witness spouse's
statement... into evidence," not merely testifying. Id. at 639.
This distinction comports with the policies underlying the spousal testimonial
14

right. Using statements to obtain evidence against a defendant spouse is, at least, one step
removed from admitting a witness spouse's statements at trial as substantive evidence of
guilt. Unlike admitting the statements at trial, using them to find other evidence does not
function like actual trial testimony. Thus, a lower risk for marital discord exists when the
State merely uses a spouse's hearsay statements to investigate a crime.
The State further diverts attention away from the merits of this issue by claiming
that Mr. Webster lacks standing to "invoke his wife's testimonial privilege." State's Brief
at 24. The cases the State cites and its arguments supporting this claim are inapposite.
Ms. Gallegos invoked her constitutional right not to testify. Thus, Mr. Webster has never
sought to "invoke" his wife's right on her behalf.
In any event, the policies supporting the spousal testimonial right demands that the
defendant spouse be allowed to enforce the right once the witness spouse has invoked it.
Presumably, when a witness spouse chooses not to testify he or she seeks to preserve
marital harmony. To prevent threatening the marriage relationship through the admission
of the witness spouse's hearsay statements, someone has to object to their admission. The
State apparently would require the witness spouse to inject him or herself into the
proceedings even though that spouse is not a party and is no longer before the court as a
witness. This approach either requires a legal-sawy witness spouse to object to the
hearsay or defense counsel must advise the witness spouse to do so. Such a scheme is
unrealistic and raises a host of problems including potential conflicts of interest. This
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view further allows the State to violate the spousal testimonial right without an effective
remedy.
The State erroneously treats the spousal testimonial right like an individual right
such as the ban against unreasonable searches or the right against self-incrimination.
Unlike those rights, the right against compelled spousal testimony focuses not an
individual liberty interest but preserving the marriage entity. As a member of the marital
unit, the defendant spouse has an equal interest in preserving the marriage. In fact, Carter
appeared to contemplate this very conclusion when it barred trial courts from admitting a
spouse's statements "over the objections of the accused spouse." 888 P.2d at 639
(emphasis added).
The State further avoids addressing the merits of this issue by asserting that Mr.
Webster did not preserve his arguments in the trial court. To the contrary, the trial court
record reveals that defense counsel specifically raised the spousal right not to testify in a
pretrial motion. R. 22-23. He then prompted the trial judge to thoroughly explain to Ms.
Gallegos the policies supporting the right. R. 38: 52. When the State elicited Ms.
Gallegos' hearsay statements from Officer Cupello, defense counsel specifically objected
to their admission. R. 38: 113. Then, during the hearing on whether to admit Ms.
Gallegos' hearsay statements, defense counsel expressed his concern that entering the
statements into evidence would effectively allow Ms. Gallegos "to testify without having
to testify" in violation of Mr. Webster's right to confrontation. R. 38: 103.
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Even if defense counsel did not sufficiently preserve this issue, the trial judge
plainly erred in admitting the hearsay statements. Under the plain error doctrine, this
Court will review an issue when (1) the trial court errs; (2) "the error should have been
obvious to the trial court;" and (3) "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant

" State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09

(Utah 1993). As detailed above, the admission of a spouse's incriminating hearsay
statements violated the spousal testimonial right just as if the spouse actually testifies.
Given Carter's warning not to admit "the witness spouse's statement... into evidence at
trial over the objections of the accused spouse" this error should have been apparent to the
trial judge. Carter, 888 P.2d at 639. Finally, Ms. Gallegos' statements directly resulted in
Mr. Webster's conviction because they provided the only evidence establishing the
perpetrator's identity and intent. Thus, the trial judge plainly erred in admitting Ms.
Gallegos' statements after she invoked her right not to testify.

II.

THE ADMISSION OF THE PRIOR OFFENSE SIMPLY
SERVED TO PREJUDICE THE DEFENSE

Like the admission of the hearsay statements, the State misconstrues the
circumstances surrounding the admission of Mr. Webster's prior offense and minimizes
the devastating effects that evidence had on the trial. The prior offense had little
probative value because it occurred seven years previously and was totally unconnected
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to this case. In any event, the striking similarities between this case and the prior offense
severely biased the jury.
The State erroneously contends that identity, intent and absence of mistake remain
at issue even if the trial court properly admitted Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements. To the
contrary, Ms. Gallegos' statements conclusively established the perpetrator's identity.
When identity is not at issue, the trial court abuses its discretion in admitting prior crimes
evidence for that purpose. State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 429-30 (Utah 1989).
Further, Ms. Gallegos' allegations eliminated any possibility that Mr. Webster
mistakenly took the car. She claimed that Mr. Webster (1) lied about taking the car, (2)
misrepresented that he had permission to use it, and (3) knew that he had to return the car
before terminating his employment. This evidence shows that Mr. Webster intentionally
took the car.
The State attacks Mr. Webster for claiming on appeal that Ms. Gallegos'
statements rendered identity, intent and absence of mistake nonissues because it notes that
at trial Mr. Webster challenged the adequacy of the evidence of these issues. State's
Brief at 29. Mr. Webster should hardly be faulted for exercising his due process right to
require the State to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In any
event, the State fails to appreciate that defense counsel adopted this trial strategy based on
his reliance that the State had not given him notice of its intent to admit Ms. Gallegos'
hearsay statements under the residual hearsay exception. Once defense counsel had
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committed to this course, he could not have abandoned it midstream without completely
destroying his credibility before the jury.
Even if identity, intent or absence of mistake remained issues below, the trial judge
failed to "scrupulously examine[]" the admissibility of the prior act evidence. State v.
Decorso. 1999 UT 57, If 18, 993 P.2d 837. As the State concedes, the trial judge knew
nothing about the circumstances of the prior conviction. State's Brief at 29. He never
inquired into the circumstances of the crime, the type of crime for which Mr. Webster
was convicted or the required mental state for the conviction. The only evidence of that
incident was Officer Cupello's statement that Mr. Webster admitted to being convicted
for "driving a vehicle off of a dealership lot." R. 38: 112. Thus, the prior crime evidence
failed to even address Mr. Webster's knowledge or intent in taking the car in either
instance.
The trial judge further failed to even acknowledge the lengthy time gap between
this case and the prior offense. Evidence of a prior crime "'must be reasonably close in
time to the crime charged.'" Featherson, 781 P.2d at 430 (quoting United States v. Cuch,
842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988)). The seven-year time gap between incidents
renders the prior offense useless. As the Utah Supreme Court recently concluded,
"unrelated" but similar offenses are rarely relevant. State v. Reed. 2000 UT 68, % 28 &
n.3 (involving unrelated sex crimes).
Even assuming the prior act had probative value, the lack of detail and the
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similarities between the crimes ensured the jury would be prejudiced. The State claims
that the absence of circumstances surrounding the prior act Msanitize[d],f the offense for
the jury. State's Brief at 32. If anything, the lack of context persuades against admitting
the evidence because it invited the jury to fill in gaps to make sense of the prior crime. In
this case, for example, logic dictated to the jury that the trial judge had no reason to admit
the prior crime evidence unless it was similar to the present case.
The absence of detail and the apparent similarities between the offenses sent the
obvious message to the jury that because Mr. Webster committed a similar crime
previously he must have committed the same crime again. The prior act simply served to
show that Mr. Webster had a "propensity" to steal cars from car dealers. State v.
Saunders. 1999 UT 59, U 15, 992 P.2d 951. This very fear is at the heart of the
prohibition against admitting prior crimes evidence. Id The trial judge, thus, abused his
discretion in admitting it.

III.

UNDER ANY PROPOSED VIEW OF THE JURY'S
VERDICT, THE JURY CONVICTED MR. WEBSTER
UNDER SUBSECTION 3(E) OF THE WRONGFUL
APPROPRIATION STATUTE WHICH IMPOSED AN
INFRACTION OR, AT MOST, A CLASS A
MISDEMEANOR

The State misunderstands the jury's verdict and the applicable law concerning Mr.
Webster's conviction and punishment. Rather than convicting Mr. Webster under
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subsection 3(a) of the wrongful appropriation statute, the jury specifically convicted Mr.
Webster of taking a motor vehicle under subsection 3(e). But, because the legislature
failed to specify the penalty for that crime, this Court must decide the appropriate
punishment. Regardless of which statute actually defined Mr. Webster's offense, Mr.
Webster only committed an infraction or, at most, a class A misdemeanor.
As a threshold matter, this Court must decide under which subsection of the
wrongful appropriation statute the jury found Mr. Webster guilty. The State concedes
that Mr. Webster was specifically charged, tried and convicted for taking "an operable
motor vehicle." State's Brief at 34-35. At all relevant instances, subsection 3(e) applied
to the "unauthorized control of motor vehicles." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(e)
(Supp. 1998). In contrast, subsection 3(a) applied to wrongful appropriation crimes
generally. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(a) (1999). Since "a more specific provision
always takes precedence over a more general provision," it appears to be axiomatic that
the jury convicted Mr. Webster under subsection 3(e) of the wrongful appropriation
statute. State v. Hinson. 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Although not entirely clear from the State's brief, the State, nevertheless, appears
to reason that subsections 3(a) and 3(e) define distinct offenses and that the jury convicted
Mr. Webster of a greater crime under subsection 3(a). State's Brief at 37-38.
Specifically, the State argues that subsection 3(a) requires the specific intent to
"temporarily deprive" a person of possession of property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-621

404.5(1) (Supp. 1998); see State's Brief at 38-39. The State then asserts that subsection
3(e) requires no such intent. Because the jury found that Mr. Webster had an intent to
temporarily take the car, the State claims that subsection 3(a) applies.
The State confuses the wrongful appropriation statute. That provision defined
wrongful appropriation the same under both subsections 3(a) and 3(e), including the same
mental state:
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of
another, without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and
with the intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the
property or to temporarily deprive the owner of legal custodian
of possession of the property."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(1) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). Following this
definition, subsections 3(a) through 3(e) listed various penalties depending on the type
and value of the property taken. But, they did not define separate offenses.
The State erroneously assumes that subsection 3(e)'s reference to "an act of
unauthorized control of motor vehicles" defines a separate offense. State's Brief at 38;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(e) (Supp. 1998). The State, like the trial judge below,
fails to recognize that section 76-6-404.5 specifically defines wrongful appropriation as
obtaining or exercising "unauthorized control" over property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6404.5(1) (Supp. 1998). Rather than referring to a separate crime, subsection 3(e) simply
gives a shorthand definition of the crime of wrongful appropriation.
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Even if subsection 3(e) referenced to the crime of "unauthorized control/' the
definition of that crime appears to be identical to the definition of wrongful appropriation.
At the time of Mr. Webster's offense, two statutes in the Motor Vehicle Act criminalized
the temporary misuse of a motor vehicle: (1) unlawful control of a motor vehicle under
Utah Code Annotated section 41-la-1311 (1993) to which subsection 3(e) referred; and,
(2) unauthorized control of a vehicle for an extended time under 41-1 a-1314 (1998). The
definitions for both of these crimes are virtually identical to the definition for wrongful
appropriation, including the mental state. See Addenda A, B.
Thus, under any of the above scenarios, the jury specifically found that Mr.
Webster possessed the same intent under both subsection 3(a) and subsection 3(e). Since
subsection 3(e) specifically applied to motor vehicles, the law requires this Court to apply
that provision as the more specific one. State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998). In sum, subsection 3(e) controls.
Having established the correct subsection, this Court must decide the penalty under
that provision. The State correctly argues that Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-105(2)
(1999) requires trial judges to impose an infraction only when the legislature fails to
specify the penalty for crimes defined "outside this code." In contrast, section 76-3-105
professes that crimes defined "within this code [are] expressly designated11 as infractions.
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-105(2) (1999). The "code" referred to appears to mean the
Criminal Code under Title 76 of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-101 (1999)
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(designating Title 76 as the "Utah Criminal Code").
If this Court concludes that subsection 3(e) refers to the crime of unauthorized
control of a vehicle under one of the sections of the Motor Vehicle Act, Mr. Webster only
committed an infraction. Section 76-3-105 compels this result because the offense of
unauthorized control was "defined outside" the Criminal Code and the legislature failed to
specify any penalty under subsection 3(e).
On the other hand, if this Court concludes that the wrongful appropriation statute
defined Mr. Webster's offense, section 76-3-105 does not specify the procedure for
determining the penalty because Mr. Webster's crime would be defined "within" the
Criminal Code. As explained above, section 76-3-105 does not address this situation. It
simply assumes that crimes defined within the Criminal Code have specified penalties.
The rule of lenity provides the answer. This court has ruled that "in case of doubt
or uncertainty as to the degree of crime, [the accused] is entitled to the lesser.'" State v.
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334,
336 (Utah 1971)). In this case, the rule requires imposition of either an infraction or the
former penalty under subsection 3(e), a class A misdemeanor, rather than a third degree
felony which is now in force.
The ban against ex post fact laws confirms this conclusion. U.S. Const, art. I; §
9(3); Utah Const., art. I; § 18. As explained, at most, Mr. Webster committed a class A
misdemeanor when he temporarily took the car. Increasing the penalty now to a third
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degree felony makes the punishment for his crime more '"burdensome"' after he
committed it. State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App. 343,^12, 992 P.2d 995 (quoting
Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1026 (Utah 1996) (additional citations omitted)). The
Constitution forbids such action.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Mr. Webster's conviction and remand for a new trial, or
in the alternative, vacate his sentence and order the trial judge to impose an infraction or a
class A misdemeanor.

Dated this 3c^ day of August, 2000.

KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers,
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior consent — Accessory or accomplice.
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different person.
(3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 100; 1941, ch.
50, § 1; 1941 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1; C. 1943,
57-3a-110; L. 1983, ch. 190, § 2; 1986, ch. 32,
§ 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 52; C. 1953, 41-M09; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, § 168.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective January 30, 1992, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as
§ 41-1-109; substituted "motor vehicle, trailer,
or semitrailer" for "vehicle" in three places; de-

leted former Subsection (2) which made an offense under the section a third-degree felony if
the vehicle was not returned within 24 hours;
redesignated former Subsections (3) and (4) as
Subsections (2) and t3); and made stylistic
changes.
Cross-Beferences. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

ADDENDUM B

41-la-1314. Unauthorized control for extended time.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), it is a class A misdemeanor for a
person to exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer, not his own, without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian,
and with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of
possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the
control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different
person.
(3) Violation of this section is a third degree felony if:
(a) the person does not return the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer
to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of
unlawful control; or
(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct of the person committing
the offense:
(i) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in an
amount of $500 or more;
(ii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is used to commit a
felony; or
(iii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in any
amount to facilitate entry into it or its operation.
(4) It is not a defense to Subsection (3)(a) that someone other than the
person, or an agent of the person, returned the motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer within 24 hours.
History: C. 1953, 41-la-1314, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 1, § 171; 1997, ch. 100, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, rewrote Subsection (1), moving the former provisions to Subsection (3)(a), and added Subsections (3) and
(4).

Cross-References. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

